HoneyLabs

Akin HTTP request fingerprint

a10cun030_0000004a_c91eaf54

Seen 2026-09-23 to 2026-09-23 across the retained window.

1

Source IPs

1

Networks

1

Countries

1

Ports hit

1

Events

1

IPs / network

This fingerprint is spread thinly across many networks, which is the shape of a common, widely-used client.

Top networks

Countries

US 1

Ports targeted

What it requests

GET/1

User agents claimed

https://mob.army/medical - adversarial NEURO-weapons are rapidly propagating throughout NATO 35.7989269, -85.01598691 IPs1
Source IPCCNetwork Last seenEvents
47.42.234.181USAS20115 Charter Communications LLC2026-09-231

Related fingerprints

Clients whose header set is within two of this one, measured from the tokens themselves.

a11cun030_0000004a_c91eaf54same header set60 IPs175a11cun040_0000004e_608dab681 header apart453 IPs6.0Ka11cun020_00000048_724c10fb1 header apart97 IPs563a11cun040_0000004b_4c87b06e1 header apart113 IPs516a10cun020_0000000a_78f1f19c1 header apart101 IPs453a11cun040_0000004e_36fbce141 header apart320 IPs365a11cun040_0000004b_00b09b791 header apart1 IPs183a11cun031_00000048_e62b6d851 header apart2 IPs102

About this fingerprint

Akin fingerprints an HTTP client from the request head alone: the protocol version, line endings, body framing, which headers are present, and the grammar of the negotiation header values. The User-Agent string and the request path are deliberately excluded, because both are trivially changed and both were measured varying within a single operator, so a scanner that rotates either keeps one fingerprint. The middle section is a presence bitmap rather than a hash, so two tokens can be compared directly to see how many headers the clients differ by.