UDP traffic

Datagrams matching country:ID sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Clear search

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

Datagrams

Source addresses

Networks

Countries

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Other services

1 datagrams from 1 source

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

SOCKS5 1

Latest SOCKS5 datagram, to 56271/udp

·4Vx·

payload bytes

00000000  05 00 ff ff 00 fe fe fe  fe fd fd fd fd 12 34 56  |..............4V|
00000010  78 07 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |x...............|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000040  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000070  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000080  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000090  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|

Unrecognised

3 datagrams from 2 sources

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Unrecognised 3

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 11211/udp

0.·E·{·+6faf#?`>·c;·%,J>h·rSLGj·\e·2

payload bytes

00000000  30 2e 16 45 14 7b 1e 2b  36 66 61 66 23 3f 60 3e  |0..E.{.+6faf#?`>|
00000010  1e 1d 17 13 63 3b 05 25  2c 4a 3e 68 1c 72 53 4c  |....c;.%,J>h.rSL|
00000020  47 6a 11 5c 65 89 32                              |Gj.\e.2|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

Service	Port	Datagrams	Sources	Factor
mDNS	5353/udp	1	1	2 to 10
Memcached	11211/udp	1	1	10,000 to 51,000

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

5353/udp mDNS1
11211/udp Memcached1
27015/udp Steam1
56271/udp SOCKS51

Networks

AS150968 PT Jaringanku Media Telekomunikasi from 1 source2
AS17995 PT iForte Global Internet from 1 source1
AS139994 PT XL Axiata Tbk from 1 source1

Countries

ID Indonesia4

Source addresses (unverified)

Address	Network	Cc	Sends	Datagrams	Last seen (UTC)
103.123.175.6	AS150968 PT Jaringanku Media Telekomunikasi	ID	Unrecognised	2	2026-10-06 21:55
110.92.72.90	AS17995 PT iForte Global Internet	ID	Unrecognised	1	2026-10-06 00:31
103.3.220.19	AS139994 PT XL Axiata Tbk	ID	SOCKS5	1	2026-10-06 09:15

Latest datagrams

2026-10-06 21:55:10103.123.175.6to 11211/udpUnrecognisedID

0.·E·{·+6faf#?`>·c;·%,J>h·rSLGj·\e·2

payload bytes

00000000  30 2e 16 45 14 7b 1e 2b  36 66 61 66 23 3f 60 3e  |0..E.{.+6faf#?`>|
00000010  1e 1d 17 13 63 3b 05 25  2c 4a 3e 68 1c 72 53 4c  |....c;.%,J>h.rSL|
00000020  47 6a 11 5c 65 89 32                              |Gj.\e.2|

2026-10-06 09:15:32103.3.220.19to 56271/udpSOCKS5ID

·4Vx·

payload bytes

00000000  05 00 ff ff 00 fe fe fe  fe fd fd fd fd 12 34 56  |..............4V|
00000010  78 07 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |x...............|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000040  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000070  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000080  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000090  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
000000f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
... 512 bytes shown in part

2026-10-06 03:13:06103.123.175.6to 5353/udpUnrecognisedID
m.2oA^X·m5·SFb·
payload bytes
```
00000000  6d 2e 32 6f 41 5e 58 10  6d 35 10 53 46 62 fd e8  |m.2oA^X.m5.SFb..|
```

2026-10-06 00:31:43110.92.72.90to 27015/udpUnrecognisedID

·TSource Engine Query·

payload bytes

00000000  ff ff ff ff 54 53 6f 75  72 63 65 20 45 6e 67 69  |....TSource Engi|
00000010  6e 65 20 51 75 65 72 79  00                       |ne Query.|