UDP traffic
Datagrams matching ip:107.173.67.223 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans
1
Datagrams
1
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
1
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Unrecognised
1 datagrams from 1 sourceDatagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.
Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 5353/udp
payload bytes
00000000 30 2e 2f 16 38 26 25 7a 36 44 38 40 5e 6f 52 b5 |0./.8&%z6D8@^oR.| 00000010 e5 |.|
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| mDNS | 5353/udp | 1 | 1 | 2 to 10 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 107.173.67.223 | AS36352 HostPapa | US | Unrecognised | 1 | 2026-10-06 02:07 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 30 2e 2f 16 38 26 25 7a 36 44 38 40 5e 6f 52 b5 |0./.8&%z6D8@^oR.| 00000010 e5 |.|