HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching ip:146.88.240.40 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

9

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

5

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

3 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest TFTP datagram, to 69/udp

·ay9mfwq7xxmd4w6c7·octet·

payload bytes
00000000  00 01 61 79 39 6d 66 77  71 37 78 78 6d 64 34 77  |..ay9mfwq7xxmd4w|
00000010  36 63 37 a0 00 6f 63 74  65 74 00                 |6c7..octet.|

Other services

6 datagrams from 1 source

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest STUN datagram, to 8088/udp

·!· D ·4Vx·#Eg

payload bytes
00000000  00 01 00 00 21 12 0a 44  20 12 34 56 78 9a bc de  |....!..D .4Vx...|
00000010  f1 23 45 67                                       |.#Eg|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
TFTP69/udp2160
NetBIOS137/udp113.8

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
146.88.240.40AS20052 Arbor Networks, Inc.USSTUN92026-10-06 14:35

Latest datagrams