UDP traffic
Datagrams matching ip:146.88.241.170 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
10
Datagrams
1
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
7
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
1 datagrams from 1 sourceRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp
payload bytes
Unrecognised
8 datagrams from 1 sourceDatagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.
Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 27025/udp
payload bytes
00000000 ff ff ff ff 54 54 53 6f 75 72 63 65 20 45 6e 67 |....TTSource Eng| 00000010 69 6e 65 20 51 75 65 72 79 |ine Query|
Peer-to-peer
1 datagrams from 1 sourceFile-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DNS | 53/udp | 1 | 1 | 28 to 54 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Destination ports
DNS questions
DNS record types
- A1
Networks
- AS20052 Arbor Networks, Inc. from 1 source10
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 146.88.241.170 | AS20052 Arbor Networks, Inc. | US | Unrecognised | 10 | 2026-10-07 01:12 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 ff ff ff ff 54 54 53 6f 75 72 63 65 20 45 6e 67 |....TTSource Eng| 00000010 69 6e 65 20 51 75 65 72 79 |ine Query|
payload bytes
00000000 5c 73 74 61 74 75 73 5c 00 |\status\.|
payload bytes
00000000 5c 73 74 61 74 75 73 5c 00 |\status\.|
payload bytes
payload bytes
00000000 ff ff ff ff 54 54 53 6f 75 72 63 65 20 45 6e 67 |....TTSource Eng| 00000010 69 6e 65 20 51 75 65 72 79 |ine Query|
payload bytes
00000000 ff ff ff ff 54 54 53 6f 75 72 63 65 20 45 6e 67 |....TTSource Eng| 00000010 69 6e 65 20 51 75 65 72 79 |ine Query|
payload bytes
00000000 64 31 3a 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 41 41 41 41 41 |d1:d2:id20:AAAAA| 00000010 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 39 |AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA9| 00000020 3a 69 6e 66 6f 5f 68 61 73 68 32 30 3a 42 42 42 |:info_hash20:BBB| 00000030 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 |BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB| 00000040 65 31 3a 71 39 3a 67 65 74 5f 70 65 65 72 73 31 |e1:q9:get_peers1| 00000050 3a 74 32 3a 61 61 31 3a 79 31 3a 71 65 |:t2:aa1:y1:qe|
payload bytes
00000000 ff ff ff ff 54 54 53 6f 75 72 63 65 20 45 6e 67 |....TTSource Eng| 00000010 69 6e 65 20 51 75 65 72 79 |ine Query|
payload bytes
00000000 ff ff ff ff 54 54 53 6f 75 72 63 65 20 45 6e 67 |....TTSource Eng| 00000010 69 6e 65 20 51 75 65 72 79 |ine Query|
payload bytes
00000000 02 |.|