HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching ip:146.88.241.40 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

7

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

6

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

1 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query A 00065d24d66ffedb.7c40.<HONEYPOT>.asertdnsresearch.com

payload bytes

Other services

1 datagrams from 1 source

First packets of sessions with VPN, voice, tunnelling, database and management services.

Latest STUN datagram, to 3478/udp

·!· D ·4Vx·#Eg

payload bytes
00000000  00 01 00 00 21 12 0a 44  20 12 34 56 78 9a bc de  |....!..D .4Vx...|
00000010  f1 23 45 67                                       |.#Eg|

Unrecognised

5 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 3283/udp

·

payload bytes
00000000  00 14 00 01 03                                    |.....|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp1128 to 54

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
146.88.241.40AS20052 Arbor Networks, Inc.USUnrecognised72026-10-06 14:41

Latest datagrams