UDP traffic
Datagrams matching ip:172.235.50.127 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans
2
Datagrams
1
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
2
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Unrecognised
2 datagrams from 1 sourceDatagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.
Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 5353/udp
payload bytes
00000000 1a 2e 76 62 18 28 02 30 2b 2a 5f 51 27 6e 4d 63 |..vb.(.0+*_Q'nMc| 00000010 38 66 08 55 35 04 2a 5f 20 2f 66 68 67 24 6c a8 |8f.U5.*_ /fhg$l.| 00000020 d2 |.|
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 172.235.50.127 | AS63949 Akamai Connected Cloud | US | Unrecognised | 2 | 2026-10-06 16:25 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 1a 2e 76 62 18 28 02 30 2b 2a 5f 51 27 6e 4d 63 |..vb.(.0+*_Q'nMc| 00000010 38 66 08 55 35 04 2a 5f 20 2f 66 68 67 24 6c a8 |8f.U5.*_ /fhg$l.| 00000020 d2 |.|
payload bytes
00000000 64 2e 63 0f 51 36 21 09 2e 2c 2a 7f 4f 5d 25 3d |d.c.Q6!..,*.O]%=| 00000010 21 66 4f 7d 55 30 48 3b 60 0a 66 77 4a 58 23 2f |!fO}U0H;`.fwJX#/| 00000020 3d 06 3e 0e 3c 5f 17 6a 0b 41 6a 5a 1f 0f 18 40 |=.>.<_.j.AjZ...@| 00000030 75 4b 72 |uKr|