UDP traffic
Datagrams matching ip:185.73.23.133 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
12
Datagrams
1
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
3
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
8 datagrams from 1 sourceRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp
payload bytes
00000000 13 e6 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 69 6d 73 |.............ims| 00000010 06 6d 6e 63 30 30 31 06 6d 63 63 32 36 32 0b 33 |.mnc001.mcc262.3| 00000020 67 70 70 6e 65 74 77 6f 72 6b 03 6f 72 67 00 00 |gppnetwork.org..| 00000030 01 00 01 |...|
Unrecognised
4 datagrams from 1 sourceDatagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.
Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 5684/udp
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.}p..well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DNS | 53/udp | 4 | 1 | 28 to 54 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Destination ports
DNS questions
DNS record types
- A4
Networks
- AS29484 Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum from 1 source12
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 185.73.23.133 | AS29484 Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum | DE | DNS | 12 | 2026-10-06 09:25 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 13 e6 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 69 6d 73 |.............ims| 00000010 06 6d 6e 63 30 30 31 06 6d 63 63 32 36 32 0b 33 |.mnc001.mcc262.3| 00000020 67 70 70 6e 65 74 77 6f 72 6b 03 6f 72 67 00 00 |gppnetwork.org..| 00000030 01 00 01 |...|
payload bytes
00000000 22 8c 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 69 6d 73 |"............ims| 00000010 06 6d 6e 63 30 30 31 06 6d 63 63 32 36 32 0b 33 |.mnc001.mcc262.3| 00000020 67 70 70 6e 65 74 77 6f 72 6b 03 6f 72 67 00 00 |gppnetwork.org..| 00000030 01 00 01 |...|
payload bytes
00000000 7d 0f 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 69 6d 73 |}............ims| 00000010 06 6d 6e 63 30 30 31 06 6d 63 63 32 36 32 0b 33 |.mnc001.mcc262.3| 00000020 67 70 70 6e 65 74 77 6f 72 6b 03 6f 72 67 00 00 |gppnetwork.org..| 00000030 01 00 01 |...|
payload bytes
00000000 95 a8 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 69 6d 73 |.............ims| 00000010 06 6d 6e 63 30 30 31 06 6d 63 63 32 36 32 0b 33 |.mnc001.mcc262.3| 00000020 67 70 70 6e 65 74 77 6f 72 6b 03 6f 72 67 00 00 |gppnetwork.org..| 00000030 01 00 01 |...|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.}p..well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.}p..well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.}p..well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.}p..well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.}p..well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.}p..well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.}p..well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|
payload bytes
00000000 40 01 7d 70 bb 2e 77 65 6c 6c 2d 6b 6e 6f 77 6e |@.}p..well-known| 00000010 04 63 6f 72 65 |.core|