HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching ip:193.163.125.173 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

3

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

3

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

2 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query A example.com

payload bytes
00000000  9b bc 01 20 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 07 65 78 61  |... .........exa|
00000010  6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d  00 00 01 00 01           |mple.com.....|

Unrecognised

1 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 44818/udp

c·

payload bytes
00000000  63 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |c...............|
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                           |........|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
Portmap111/udp117 to 28
DNS53/udp1128 to 54

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
193.163.125.173AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBDNS32026-10-06 15:01

Latest datagrams