HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching ip:199.45.154.188 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

3

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

3

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

1 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest NTP datagram, to 123/udp

·O#Kq·R·

payload bytes
00000000  e3 00 04 fa 00 01 00 00  00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  c5 4f 23 4b 71 b1 52 f3  |.........O#Kq.R.|

Unrecognised

2 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 5632/udp

NQ

payload bytes
00000000  4e 51                                             |NQ|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
NTP123/udp11556.9

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
199.45.154.188AS398722 Censys, Inc.USUnrecognised32026-10-06 20:13

Latest datagrams