HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching ip:209.141.51.29 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

4

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

4

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Unrecognised

3 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 8081/udp

&.Qz=N·

payload bytes
00000000  26 2e 51 7a 3d 4e c0                              |&.Qz=N.|

Peer-to-peer

1 datagrams from 1 source

File-sharing clients trying to reach a peer that used one of these addresses before. This is not scanning, so it is left out of every other figure on this page.

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
mDNS5353/udp112 to 10

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
209.141.51.29AS53667 FranTech SolutionsUSUnrecognised42026-10-06 23:03

Latest datagrams