UDP traffic
Datagrams matching ip:34.65.23.20 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
2
Datagrams
1
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
1
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
2 datagrams from 1 sourceRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp
payload bytes
00000000 be ef 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 |.............www| 00000010 05 73 74 61 67 65 00 00 10 00 03 |.stage.....|
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DNS | 53/udp | 2 | 1 | 28 to 54 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Destination ports
- 53/udp DNS2
DNS questions
DNS record types
- TXT2
Networks
- AS396982 Google LLC from 1 source2
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 34.65.23.20 | AS396982 Google LLC | CH | DNS | 2 | 2026-10-06 08:08 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 be ef 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 |.............www| 00000010 05 73 74 61 67 65 00 00 10 00 03 |.stage.....|
payload bytes
00000000 be ef 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 |.............www| 00000010 05 73 74 61 67 65 00 00 10 00 03 |.stage.....|