HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching ip:45.205.1.148 sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

5

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

2

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

3 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query ANY dhitc.com

payload bytes
00000000  12 71 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 01 05 64 68 69  |.q...........dhi|
00000010  74 63 03 63 6f 6d 00 00  ff 00 01 00 00 29 ff ff  |tc.com.......)..|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00                                 |......|

Unrecognised

2 datagrams from 1 source

Datagrams no decoder recognised. Their first bytes are kept.

Latest Unrecognised datagram, to 11211/udp

·version

payload bytes
00000000  00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00  76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 0d  |........version.|
00000010  0a                                                |.|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp3128 to 54
Memcached11211/udp2110,000 to 51,000

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
45.205.1.148AS215925 Vpsvault.host LtdBRDNS52026-10-06 22:43

Latest datagrams