HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching qname:"authors.bind" sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

Your plan searches up to 7d, so 30d was shortened. Plans

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Datagrams

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Source addresses

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Networks

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Countries

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Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

1 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 5353/udp

DNS query TXT/CH authors.bind

payload bytes
00000000  18 02 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 00 07 61 75 74  |.............aut|
00000010  68 6f 72 73 04 62 69 6e  64 00 00 10 00 03        |hors.bind.....|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
mDNS5353/udp112 to 10

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
47.84.179.21AS45102 Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd.SGDNS12026-10-06 17:03

Latest datagrams