UDP traffic
Datagrams matching qname:"authors.bind" sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 7 days. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
1
Datagrams
1
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
1
Destination ports
Traffic by type
Service queries
1 datagrams from 1 sourceRequests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.
Latest DNS datagram, to 5353/udp
payload bytes
00000000 18 02 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 61 75 74 |.............aut| 00000010 68 6f 72 73 04 62 69 6e 64 00 00 10 00 03 |hors.bind.....|
Amplification checks
Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.
| Service | Port | Datagrams | Sources | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| mDNS | 5353/udp | 1 | 1 | 2 to 10 |
The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.
Destination ports
- 5353/udp DNS1
DNS questions
DNS record types
- TXT1
Networks
- AS45102 Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd. from 1 source1
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 47.84.179.21 | AS45102 Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd. | SG | DNS | 1 | 2026-10-06 17:03 |
Latest datagrams
payload bytes
00000000 18 02 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 61 75 74 |.............aut| 00000010 68 6f 72 73 04 62 69 6e 64 00 00 10 00 03 |hors.bind.....|