HoneyLabs

UDP traffic

Datagrams matching qname:"ferc.gov" sent to HoneyLabs sensors over UDP in the last 24 hours. DNS questions and QUIC client fingerprints are decoded on the sensor. Other datagrams are kept as their first bytes and labelled by protocol where it can be recognised.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

4

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

1

Destination ports

Traffic by type

Service queries

4 datagrams from 1 source

Requests a service answers without a handshake. Scanners send them to find open DNS, NTP, SNMP or SSDP servers, which are also the servers reflection attacks abuse.

Latest DNS datagram, to 53/udp

DNS query ANY ferc.gov

payload bytes
00000000  45 67 01 00 00 01 00 00  00 00 00 01 04 66 65 72  |Eg...........fer|
00000010  63 03 67 6f 76 00 00 ff  00 01 00 00 29 ff ff 00  |c.gov.......)...|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00                                    |.....|

Amplification checks

Probes for services that answer a small request with a much larger reply, the property reflection attacks rely on.

ServicePortDatagramsSourcesFactor
DNS53/udp4128 to 54

The factor is how many bytes a reachable server can send back for each byte it receives, as published by CISA in alert TA14-017A.

Destination ports

DNS questions

DNS record types

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
141.98.83.48AS209588 Flyservers S.A.PADNS42026-10-06 05:58

Latest datagrams