Akin HTTP request fingerprint
b11cun148_80040017_b6ce16b9_x379753ab95539f8fce00d0f1dafedf99
Seen 2026-09-21 to 2026-09-23 across the retained window.
The feed is a URL your firewall, MISP or SIEM polls; it needs a free account so it can be revoked. Or watch the top network: AS13335 sends an email when it next hits a sensor.
63
Source IPs
1
Networks
5
Countries
1
Ports hit
961
Events
63
IPs / network
This fingerprint is concentrated: many addresses on very few networks, which is what a single coordinated operation tends to look like.
Top networks
Countries
Ports targeted
What it requests
User agents claimed
Fingerprint family: 2 shapes, 63 IPs, 971 events in 30 days
Every shape here is within one request header of the family's largest shape and comes from the same source addresses. One tool, several request shapes; a hashed fingerprint shows these as unrelated.
HTTP/1.1, 14 headers, no body, 8 outside the core list: connection, accept-encoding, accept, user-agent, host, x-forwarded-for, cf-ipcountry, cf-visitor, x-forwarded-proto, cdn-loop, x-nextjs-data, x-middleware-subrequest, cf-connecting-ip, cf-ray
Related fingerprints
Clients whose header set is within two of this one, measured from the tokens themselves.
About this fingerprint
Akin fingerprints an HTTP client from the request head alone: the protocol version, line endings, body framing, which headers are present, and the grammar of the negotiation header values. The User-Agent string and the request path are deliberately excluded, because both are trivially changed and both were measured varying within a single operator, so a scanner that rotates either keeps one fingerprint. The middle section is a presence bitmap rather than a hash, so two tokens can be compared directly to see how many headers the clients differ by.