HoneyLabs

Akin HTTP request fingerprint

b11cuq101_0015081f_e78ad784_xe7f3

Seen 2026-03-01 to 2026-09-13 across the retained window.

The feed is a URL your firewall, MISP or SIEM polls; it needs a free account so it can be revoked. Or watch the top network: AS133246 sends an email when it next hits a sensor.

3

Source IPs

3

Networks

2

Countries

1

Ports hit

4

Events

1

IPs / network

This fingerprint is spread thinly across many networks, which is the shape of a common, widely-used client.

Top networks

Countries

US 2IN 1

Ports targeted

What it requests

POST/4

User agents claimed

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.361 IPs1
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.361 IPs1
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/120.0.0.01 IPs1
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:121.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/121.01 IPs1
Source IPCCNetwork Last seenEvents
103.81.208.45INAS133246 softnet network2026-09-132
68.178.167.214USAS26496 GoDaddy.com, LLC2026-09-061
47.251.42.6USAS45102 Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd.2026-09-051

Fingerprint family: 2 shapes, 3 IPs, 6 events in 30 days

Every shape here is within one request header of the family's largest shape and comes from the same source addresses. One tool, several request shapes; a hashed fingerprint shows these as unrelated.

HTTP/1.1, 10 headers, Content-Length body, 1 outside the core list: connection, accept-encoding, accept, accept-language, user-agent, content-length, content-type, host, cache-control, next-action

asks for/ (POST)
asMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) · Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:121.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/121.0 · Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like and 3 more
ports443
fromIN · US · softnet network · GoDaddy.com, LLC · Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd.
b11cuq101_0015081f_e78ad784_xe7f3 this oneMozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like · /3 IPs4b11cuq111_0015083f_52658904_xe7f3+/- upgrade-insecure-requests · Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, lik · /2 IPs2

Related fingerprints

Clients whose header set is within two of this one, measured from the tokens themselves.

b11cuq101_0015081f_0217e38d_xe7f3same header set3 IPs3b11cuq111_0015083f_197d06bc_xe7f31 header apart3 IPs4b11cuq111_0015083f_52658904_xe7f31 header apart2 IPs2b11cuq111_0115081f_10fe8911_xe7f31 header apart2 IPs2b11cuq081_00050817_735c1356_xe7f32 headers apart4 IPs360b11cuq080_0005081f_76504ff62 headers apart2 IPs150b11cuq100_0015083f_6d3912e02 headers apart6 IPs87b11cuq080_0015081d_40a2ef4e2 headers apart6 IPs7

About this fingerprint

Akin fingerprints an HTTP client from the request head alone: the protocol version, line endings, body framing, which headers are present, and the grammar of the negotiation header values. The User-Agent string and the request path are deliberately excluded, because both are trivially changed and both were measured varying within a single operator, so a scanner that rotates either keeps one fingerprint. The middle section is a presence bitmap rather than a hash, so two tokens can be compared directly to see how many headers the clients differ by.