HoneyLabs

UDP traffic / QUIC JA4 client fingerprint

q13i0307h9_55b375c5d22e_2f871f65fa7d

QUIC JA4 client fingerprint. 16 datagrams in the last 30 days, last seen 2026-10-10 18:26 UTC.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

16

Datagrams

16

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

2

Destination ports

Traffic by type

QUIC

16 datagrams from 16 sources

Initial packets of HTTP/3 connections, decoded on the sensor.

Latest QUIC datagram, to 443/udp

QUIC v1 Initial alpn=http/0.9,http/1.0,spdy/1,spdy/2,spdy/3,stun.turn,stun.nat-discovery,h2c,webrtc,c-webrtc,ftp,imap,pop3,managesieve,coap,co

Destination ports

QUIC clients (JA4)

QUIC transport parameters

QUIC versions

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
195.96.139.189AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-06 01:02
195.96.139.131AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-09 00:40
87.236.176.181AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-06 01:12
185.247.137.167AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-10 06:01
87.236.176.169AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-07 09:04
185.247.137.240AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-08 18:35
185.247.137.106AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-10 18:26
185.247.137.34AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-09 06:40
87.236.176.221AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-08 04:42
195.96.139.236AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-10 11:44
195.96.139.63AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-08 17:15
87.236.176.47AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-07 01:52
185.247.137.232AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-09 05:56
185.247.137.174AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-06 09:56
87.236.176.44AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-06 08:20
87.236.176.243AS211298 Driftnet LtdGBQUIC12026-10-06 10:21

Latest datagrams

About this fingerprint

JA4 over QUIC fingerprints the TLS ClientHello carried inside a client's QUIC Initial packets, with a q prefix in place of t. Initial packets are encrypted with keys anyone can derive from the packet itself, which is how the sensor reads the ClientHello without answering. The same client library and version produce the same JA4.