HoneyLabs

UDP traffic / QUIC JA4 client fingerprint

q13i0310h3_55b375c5d22e_df5b9e597968

QUIC JA4 client fingerprint. 4 datagrams in the last 30 days, last seen 2026-10-08 16:13 UTC.

A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.

4

Datagrams

1

Source addresses

1

Networks

1

Countries

1

Destination ports

Traffic by type

QUIC

4 datagrams from 1 source

Initial packets of HTTP/3 connections, decoded on the sensor.

Latest QUIC datagram, to 443/udp

QUIC v1 Initial alpn=h3,h3-29

Destination ports

QUIC clients (JA4)

QUIC transport parameters

QUIC versions

Networks

Countries

Source addresses (unverified)

AddressNetworkCcSendsDatagramsLast seen (UTC)
138.246.253.137AS12816 Leibniz-RechenzentrumDEQUIC42026-10-08 16:13

Latest datagrams

About this fingerprint

JA4 over QUIC fingerprints the TLS ClientHello carried inside a client's QUIC Initial packets, with a q prefix in place of t. Initial packets are encrypted with keys anyone can derive from the packet itself, which is how the sensor reads the ClientHello without answering. The same client library and version produce the same JA4.