UDP traffic / QUIC transport parameter fingerprint
94dccb934778
QUIC transport parameter fingerprint. 4 datagrams in the last 30 days, last seen 2026-10-08 16:13 UTC.
A UDP source address can be forged, so each address listed here either sent the traffic or was impersonated by whoever did. UDP traffic is kept out of verdicts, feeds, watchlists and alerts.
Parameters as offered
1=1000,3=1452,4=786432,5=524288,6=524288,7=524288,8=100,9=100,b=26,c,e=4,f/0,20=0,grease
4
Datagrams
1
Source addresses
1
Networks
1
Countries
1
Destination ports
Traffic by type
QUIC
4 datagrams from 1 sourceInitial packets of HTTP/3 connections, decoded on the sensor.
Latest QUIC datagram, to 443/udp
Destination ports
- 443/udp QUIC4
QUIC clients (JA4)
- q13i0310h3_55b375c5d22e_df5b9e597968 from 1 source4
QUIC transport parameters
- 94dccb934778 from 1 source4
QUIC versions
- 14
Networks
- AS12816 Leibniz-Rechenzentrum from 1 source4
Countries
Source addresses (unverified)
| Address | Network | Cc | Sends | Datagrams | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 138.246.253.137 | AS12816 Leibniz-Rechenzentrum | DE | QUIC | 4 | 2026-10-08 16:13 |
Latest datagrams
About this fingerprint
A hash of the QUIC transport parameters a client offers: which parameters it sends and the values it picks for flow-control limits, idle timeout and connection IDs. Parameter order and GREASE values are normalised before hashing. Two clients with the same TLS stack but different QUIC libraries usually differ here.